This paper analyzes the formalizations of information-theoretic security for the fundamental primitives in cryptography: symmetric-key encryption and key agreement. Revisiting the previous results, we can formalize information-theoretic security using different methods, by extending Shannon's perfect secrecy, by information-theoretic analogues of indistinguishability and semantic security, and by the frameworks for composability of protocols. We show the relationships among the security formalizations and obtain the following results. First, in the case of encryption, there are significant gaps among the formalizations, and a certain type of relaxed perfect secrecy or a variant of information-theoretic indistinguishability is the strongest notion. Second, in the case of key agreement, there are significant gaps among the formalizations, and a certain type of relaxed perfect secrecy is the strongest notion. In particular, in both encryption and key agreement, the formalization of composable security is not stronger than any other formalizations. Furthermore, as an application of the relationships in encryption and key agreement, we simultaneously derive a family of lower bounds on the size of secret keys and security quantities required under the above formalizations, which also implies the importance and usefulness of the relationships.
Security Formalizations and Their Relationships
for Encryption and Key Agreement in Information-Theoretic Cryptography
I. INTRODUCTION
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIT.2017.2744650 information-theoretic measure (e.g., Shannon entropy, statistical distance) or probability (e.g., success probability of adversary's guessing), and it intends to represent the security that is guaranteed against the adversary having unbounded (i.e., infinite) computational resources, whereas computational security is guaranteed against the computationally bounded adversary (i.e., polynomial-time Turing machine). The merits and demerits of information-theoretic cryptography, compared to the computational cryptography are briefly stated as follows. The most attractive merit lies in the security, namely, information-theoretic security does not depend on computational models, computing powers of adversaries, and the progress of computer technology. For instance, informationtheoretic security is maintained even if a quantum computer appears. It is not necessary to focus on the adversary's computing power, and long-term security is possible. Meanwhile, the demerit of information-theoretic cryptography lies in the restrictions of realizable mechanisms and achievable efficiency of systems. Specifically, each user in a system will need to have some secret information (i.e., secret key) if there is no assumption (e.g., neither a noisy channel nor a quantum channel). Furthermore, the size of secret keys required in a cryptographic system is large. Therefore, the relationships between security and efficiency (e.g., size of secret keys) in systems need to be analyzed. We can consider the symmetric-key encryption and key-agreement as fundamental cryptographic systems, and the model of the systems can be formalized in a simple and basic setting where there are two honest players (named Alice and Bob) and an adversary (named Eve). Until now, various results on the topic of those systems with informationtheoretic security have been reported and developed since Shannon's work [42] . In most of those results, the traditional security definition has been adopted as stand-alone security in the sense that the system will be used in a stand-alone way. In symmetric-key encryption, the security is formalized as I (M; C) = 0 (Shannon's perfect secrecy) or its relaxed version I (M; C) ≤ for some small , where M and C are random variables that take values in sets of plaintexts and ciphertexts, respectively. Similarly, in key agreement, the security is usually formalized as I (K ; T ) = 0 or its relaxed version I (K ; T ) ≤ , where K and T are random variables that take values in sets of shared keys and transcripts, respectively. Furthermore, the symmetric-key encryption can have security formalization by an information-theoretic analogue of 0018-9448 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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indistinguishability or semantic security by Goldwasser and Micali [21] . These information-theoretic analogues of indistinguishability and semantic security are useful in exploring the relationship between information-theoretic security and computational security. However, this kind of stand-alone security analysis does not explain what will happen when we combine information-theoretically secure systems with other cryptographic systems. Specifically, stand-alone security analysis does not always guarantee that the composition of individually secure systems results in a secure system as well, where secure is meant in the sense of the traditional definition of stand-alone security.
Composable security (or security under composition) is defined to guarantee the security of the composition of protocols. The widely used frameworks in this line of research are the universal composability (UC) by Canetti [8] , [9] and reactive simulatability by Backes et al. [3] (see also [4] , [8] , [20] , [36] , [37] for related works). In these frameworks, to guarantee the composability of cryptographic protocols, an idealized functionality is defined for each component protocol. A protocol under consideration is constructed such that what an adversary can do for the protocol is simulated by an ideal adversary called a simulator, which works with only public information. There is no difference between the real execution of the protocol involving the adversary and the predefined ideal functionality involving the simulator by utilizing the ideal-world real-world paradigm. Furthermore, another related but different framework called constructive cryptography 1 is proposed by Maurer and Renner [30] , [31] . In this framework, (cryptographic) protocols are considered to be transformations that construct one resource to another, where a resource represents a variety of systems (not necessarily cryptographic ones), such as a secret key and a channel. To guarantee the composability of protocols in this framework, we consider a specific application of the protocol to a certain type of resource to realize an idealized resource. For instance, by using the framework of constructive cryptography, Maurer and Tackmann [34] investigated the authenticate-thenencrypt paradigm for symmetric-key encryption in a computational security setting. The difference between constructive cryptography and the previous framework (e.g., UC) is that the former concentrates on constructions of protocols in a specific application, while the latter concentrates on the cryptographic protocol itself, which works in all environments.
B. Our Contribution
As discussed previously, several security notions and formalizations exist in information-theoretic security, which is followed by a natural question: what is the gap between the formalizations? Besides theoretical interest, it might be beneficial to show the relationships among them because of the following reasons: if several kinds of security notions turn out to be essentially equivalent, we can choose the security notions among them to prove the security of a certain cryptographic system. Meanwhile, if a gap exists between formalizations, we should be careful to consider what kind of security we need to realize, or we actually realize, by cryptographic systems. In particular, we are interested in the following points in encryption and key agreement:
• Relationships between information-theoretic and computational security: Are these security notions equivalent if we allow an adversary to have unbounded computing powers in both scenarios? • Relationships between stand-alone security and composable security: Can we compose another informationtheoretically secure primitive without additional care, under a situation where only the stand-alone security of each primitive is proven? For the former question, it is expected that the security definitions are almost equivalent because the difference between information-theoretic security and computational security lies in the computational power of the adversaries. However, we will show that this expectation does not hold in certain settings. The answer to the second question has practical importance because it tells us whether additional care is necessary or not when we compose the information-theoretically secure cryptographic systems. We will show additional care is not necessary when we combine encryption and/or key agreement with other cryptographic systems.
To investigate the above questions in detail, we formalize the information-theoretic security for symmetric-key encryption and key agreement systems in different methods. Some of them are the formalizations of stand-alone security provided by extending the traditional Shannon's perfect secrecy, or by the information-theoretic analogues of indistinguishability and semantic security, which are currently the standard notions of computational security proposed by Goldwasser and Micali in public-key cryptography. The others will be the formalizations of composable security for protocols. Specifically, we investigate the following formalizations of security in symmetric-key encryption:
(i) Traditional formalization extended or relaxed from Shannon's perfect secrecy by using mutual information; (ii) Traditional formalization extended or relaxed from Shannon's perfect secrecy by using the statistical distance (also known as the variational distance); (iii) Formalization by information-theoretic analogue of indistinguishability by Goldwasser and Micali [21] ; (iv) Formalization by information-theoretic analogue of semantic security by Goldwasser and Micali [21] ; (v) Formalization of composable security in the framework by Maurer and Renner [30] , [31] . Moreover, we similarly investigate the security formalizations (i), (ii), and (v) in key agreement.
The main contribution of this paper is to show the relationships between the formalizations above and to analyze whether there is a gap between the formalizations. Particularly, we obtain several interesting and important facts as follows:
• Relationships among stand-alone security: In the case of encryption, there are significant gaps among the formalizations of stand-alone security (i.e., those of relaxed perfect secrecy, information-theoretic indistinguishability, and information-theoretic semantic security). Specifically, a certain type of relaxed perfect secrecy or a variant of information-theoretic indistinguishability is the strongest notion. In the case of key agreement, there are significant gaps between the formalizations of notions of relaxed perfect secrecy. Therefore, we should be careful in adopting a security definition in designing encryption and/or key agreement systems depending on the situation. • Stand-alone security vs. composable security: In both encryption and key agreement, there is a significant gap between a certain formalization of relaxed perfect secrecy and that of composable security. Specifically, the formalization of composable security is not stronger than any formalization of stand-alone security. Therefore, if the encryption and/or key agreement satisfies the standalone security, they can be composed with another system without additional care in the system designs. Furthermore, as an application of the relationships in this study, we derive a family of lower bounds on the size of secret keys and those on security quantities in a comprehensive manner. If we have a (upper or lower) bound under a certain type of security definition, we can derive a family of (upper or lower) bounds under other definitions in a comprehensive manner by utilizing the relationships. Therefore, from this viewpoint of application, it is also significant to analyze and show the relationships between security formalizations in detail.
C. Related Work
There are several works that indicate gaps between standalone security and composable security. For instance, in a computational security setting, the papers [5] , [25] reported insecurity of authenticated encryption, which is composed of symmetric-key encryption and message authentication codes (MACs), even if each component is secure. In the information-theoretic security setting, the papers [2] , [16] , [26] reported gaps between stand-alone security and composable security for multiparty computation. Specifically, Kushilevitz et al. [26] investigated the gaps in several settings (i.e., perfect/statistical security and composition with adaptive/fixed inputs) and showed a condition that a protocol having stand-alone security is not necessarily secure under universal composition. Furthermore, Portmann [38] investigated the composable security of the secure informationtheoretic authentication code based on Wegman and Carter's construction [49] in the framework of constructive cryptography. Portmann [38] showed that a small gap exists between the traditional stand-alone security and composable security: the former is slightly weaker than the latter. However, Wegman and Carter's construction also meets the composable security if the almost strongly universal hash functions are carefully selected.
Bellare et al. [6] investigated the security definitions and schemes for encryption in the model of the wiretap channels [50] . Specifically, in the model of wiretap channels, they showed that the following formalizations of stand-alone security are equivalent: formalizations extended (or relaxed) from Shannon's perfect secrecy by using the mutual information and statistical distance; information-theoretic indistinguishability, which is called distinguishing security in [6] ; and information-theoretic semantic security. Although the main scope of their paper focuses in the wiretap channel and is different from the model in the present paper, their approach and ours are similar. They also showed that the first formalization by using mutual information with the restriction, where only uniformly distributed plaintexts are used as input, is weaker than other formalizations.
D. Organization of the Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the important definitions and propositions concerning the entropies and statistical distance, which are used in this paper. In Section III, we survey the composable security and its formalization in the framework of constructive cryptography. In Section IV, we revisit several formalizations of correctness and security in symmetric-key encryption and provide a comprehensive definition of the correctness and security. Section V is devoted to the main contribution in symmetric-key encryption. We show the non-asymptotic relationships between these formalizations and analyze whether there is a gap between the formalizations from the viewpoint of asymptotic security. Furthermore, as an application of the nonasymptotic relationships, we derive a family of lower bounds on the size of secret keys required under all formalizations comprehensively. In Section VI, we present similar results for key agreement. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, for an n-tuple of random variables (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ), we denote its associated probability distribution by P X 1 X 2 ···X n . For a random variable X, which takes values in a set X , we especially write P X X for the distribution on X × X defined by P X X (x, x ) := P X (x) if x = x , and P X X (x, x ) := 0 if x = x . Furthermore, |X | denotes the cardinality of X . Let P(X ) be the set of all distributions over X whose supports are X , i.e., P(X ) := {P X | P X (x) > 0, ∀x ∈ X }, and let P(X ) be the set of all distributions over X , i.e., P(X ) := {P X | P X (x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X }.
A. Definitions and Inequalities
In this subsection, we introduce several fundamental definitions, which are well-known from the literature. Moreover, we explain several inequalities, which are already known and will be used in the following sections.
First, we define entropies and statistical distance as follows. Definition 1: Let X be a random variable that takes values in a finite set X with the associated distribution P X . Then, the Shannon entropy H (X), min-entropy H ∞ (X), and Hartley entropy H 0 (X) are respectively defined by 2
H 0 (X) := log |{x ∈ X | P X (x) > 0}| . 2 Throughout this paper, we assume that log(·) := log 2 (·) and ln(·) := log e (·), and we define 0 log 0 := 0. Definition 2: Let X and Y be random variables associated with distributions P X and P Y , respectively, where X and Y take values in a finite set X . The statistical distance (also known as variational distance) between two distributions P X and P Y is defined by
Other equivalent forms of (P X , P Y ) are given as follows:
where S ranges over all subsets of X , and f ranges over all predicates on X (or equivalently, all Boolean-valued functions from X to {0, 1}). Therefore, the statistical distance can also be expressed and/or evaluated from several aspects, such as the subset of X and the predicate on X , in addition to the probability distributions. For conditional probabilities P X |Z := P X Z /P Z and P Y |Z := P Y Z /P Z , where Z is a random variable taking values in a finite set Z, the statistical distance between P X |Z and P Y |Z is defined by
Then, by definition, it immediately follows that
The above equality (3) is useful and it will be used in many instances in this paper. The statistical distance satisfies the following properties, i.e., the mathematical properties of the distance or metric, which are often used for discussion in this paper.
Proposition 1: For random variables X, Y and Z over a finite set, it holds that 1) (P X , P Y ) ≥ 0 (and (P X ,
. Furthermore, the following two properties of statistical distance are useful for our discussion in this paper.
Proposition 2: Let Y , Y , Z , Z be random variables, such that Y and Y are independent, and Z and Z are independent. Then, we have
Proof: The proof is given, for instance, in [46, Th. 8.34] .
Proposition 3 (Monotonicity):
For random variables X 1 , X 2 taking values in X , and for Y 1 , Y 2 taking values in Y, we have
More generally, for random variables Z 1 and Z 2 taking values in Z, we define
Proof: The proof for the inequality (5) is given, for example, in [46, Th. 8.32] . Monotonicity (4) immediately follows from (5) by considering a projection mapping: Let
Second, the relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler divergence is defined as follows.
Definition 3: Let P X and P Y be probability distributions over a finite set X . The relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler divergence between P X and P Y is defined by
The following proposition shows a lower bound of the relative entropy in terms of the statistical distance.
Proposition 4 (Pinsker's Inequality, [10, Lemma 12.6.1] ): Let X 1 and X 2 be random variables associated with two distributions P X 1 and P X 2 , respectively, in a finite set. Then, we have
Next, we describe the mutual information between two distributions as follows.
Definition 4: Let X and Y be random variables associated with the joint probability distribution P XY . The mutual information between X and Y is defined by
The mutual information satisfies
Moreover, we immediately obtain a lower bound of mutual information in terms of the statistical distance by applying P X 1 := P XY and P X 2 := P X P Y in Proposition 4:
Corollary 1: Let X and Y be random variables associated with two distributions P X and P Y , respectively. Then, we have
Meanwhile, the following proposition shows an upper bound on the difference of Shannon entropies in terms of the statistical distance.
Proposition 5 (Classical Case of Fannes's Inequality [18] , [10, Th. 16.3.2] ): Let X 1 and X 2 be random variables taking values in a finite set X such that (P X 1 , P X 2 ) ≤ 1/4. Then, we have
.
Let X and Y be random variables that take values in finite sets X and Y, respectively. Suppose (P XY , P X P Y ) ≤ 1/4. Then, it immediately follows from Proposition 5 by setting P X 1 := P XY and P X 2 := P X P Y that
However, we have an upper bound on I (X; Y ) tighter than (6) as shown in the following proposition. This bound was proven in [11, Lemma 1] , and in [13, Lemma 1] in the context of key agreement. Proposition 6: Let X and Y be random variables that take values in finite sets X and Y, respectively, such that |X | ≥ 4. Then, we have
B. Technical Propositions
In this subsection, we show several technical propositions that will be used in the paper.
First, we revisit the properties of statistical distance shown by Propositions 2 and 3, and consider a slight extension of those properties, which is stated by Propositions 7 and 8 below. Proposition 2 holds, if we assume that Y and Y are statistically independent and that Z and Z are also independent. Proposition 7 shows that the inequality holds, even if we assume the Markov chains Y → X → Y and Z → X → Z as follows.
Proof: The proof is simply shown as follows:
where the inequality follows from Proposition 2. Proposition 3 only considers a deterministic f , however, Proposition 8 below considers a probabilistic f , where R is the randomness used, in addition to the case of random variables conditioned. In this sense, Proposition 8 is regarded as a slight extension of Proposition 3.
Proposition 8 (Monotonicity): Let X be a random variable taking values in a finite set X , and let Y 1 and Y 2 be random variables in a finite set Y. We define random variables
is a mapping, and R is a random variable taking values in a finite set R such that R is independent from each of X, Y 1 , and Y 2 . Then, we have
Proof: The proof is shown as follows:
where the inequality follows from Proposition 3.
Second, we consider the probability Pr{X = Y } for two random variables X and Y taking values in a finite set X . We show that: (i) Pr{X = Y } is simply upper bounded by statistical distance (Proposition 9); (ii) Pr{X = Y } has another expression by using the statistical distance (Corollary 2); (iii) Pr{X = Y } is simply lower bounded by statistical distance (Corollary 3). These results will be used for the analysis of security formalizations in encryption and key agreement, while the simple properties (i), (ii), and (iii) are interesting from a mathematical viewpoint.
The following proposition shows an upper bound on Pr{X = Y } in terms of statistical distance.
Proposition 9: Let X, Y , and Z be random variables that take values in a finite set X . Then, we have
In particular, the equality holds if Z = X or Z = Y .
Proof: For distributions P X , P Y , and P Z over X , we have
Here, the equality of (7) holds, if P XY (x, x) ≤ P Z (x) for all x ∈ X . Specifically, if Z = X or Z = Y , the equality of (7) holds.
The above equality condition in Proposition 9 tells us another expression of Pr{X = Y } using the statistical distance, which leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 2: Let X and Y be random variables associated with two distributions P X and P Y , respectively, over a finite set. Then, we have Pr{X = Y } = (P XY , P X X ).
Furthermore, by Corollary 2 and Proposition 3, we have a lower bound of Pr{X = Y } in terms of the statistical distance as shown in Corollary 3 below. However, we note that it is not new because it directly follows from the result in [47, Th. 5] .
Corollary 3: Let X and Y be random variables associated with two distributions P X and P Y , respectively, in a finite set. Then, we have (P X , P Y ) ≤ Pr{X = Y }.
Next, we consider the following problem: (probabilistic) functions f and g respectively take arbitrary X as input and outputs Y and Z respectively. Then, we would like to measure the maximal difference between Y and Z using statistical distance. However, we can consider, for instance, three kinds of quantities for the measurement, i.e., 1 , 2 and 3 in Proposition 10 below. Proposition 10 shows that these quantities are equal. This result is beneficial to show several relationships between security formalizations in the following sections.
Proposition 10: Let X be a random variable that takes values in a finite set X . In addition, let Y and Z be random variables taking values in a finite set Y defined by Y := f (X, R) and Z := g(X, R ), where f, g are mappings and R, R are random variables such that X, R, R are mutually independent. We define
Then, we have 1 = 2 = 3 .
Proof: Note that (P XY , P X Z ) = (P Y |X , P Z |X ) for arbitrary P X ∈ P(X ) by (3), and hence, 1 = 2 . Then, we show 2 = 3 .
First, we show 2 ≤ 3 : For an arbitrary distribution P X ∈ P(X ), we have
Therefore, we obtain 2 ≤ 3 . Second, we prove 2 ≥ 3 : Let x 0 = arg 3 , i.e., x 0 ∈ X such that 3 = (P Y |X =x 0 , P Z |X =x 0 ). For any > 0, we define the distribution PX by
where γ is a positive real number such that
Therefore, we have 2 ≥ 3 . Proposition 11 shows an equivalent condition to measure the difference of two probabilities, P XY and P X P Y , from a certain viewpoint for binary random variables X and Y . This proposition will be used for the proof of the relationship (vi) in Theorem 1.
Proposition 11: For two binary random variables X and Y over {0, 1}, and for ∈ [0, 1], the following two conditions 
Proof: It is sufficient to show that (8) ⇒ (9), since (9) ⇒ (8) is obvious. Letting P XY be a joint probability distribution of X and Y given by Table I , the inequality (8) is equivalent to
Given that a + b + c + d = 1, the inequality (10) becomes |ad − bc| ≤ /2. Therefore, using a + b + c + d = 1 again, we have
We note that (8) ⇒ (9) in Proposition 11 does not hold if X and Y are not binary random variables.
III. COMPOSABLE SECURITY
In this paper, we consider constructive cryptography by Maurer and Renner [30] , [31] to discuss the composable security, which was developed from the early work by Maurer et al. [33] . This is because the framework of constructive cryptography enables us to analyze security of systems in a general setting where systems (resources) under consideration are described by probability distributions or random systems.
In this paper, we consider a basic scenario where there are three entities, Alice and Bob (two honest players), and Eve (an adversary).
A. Definitions of Systems and Security
At a high level of abstraction, a system is an abstract object with interfaces by which the object can interact with other systems. The interfaces are labeled with elements of a set, called a label set I. In this paper, we set I = {A, B, E}. The interfaces labeled with A, B, and E are called A-interface, B-interface, and E-interface, respectively, and they are accessible to the entities, Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively.
We briefly describe several types of systems, called a resource, a converter, a protocol, and a distinguisher, as follows. First, at a high level of abstraction, a resource system (or a resource) is an (abstract) system with I. Moreover, there is an operation, denoted by , on a set of resources called a parallel composition operation. For resources R and S, RS is defined as a resource in which the i -interface (i ∈ I) consists of the i -interfaces of R and S merged into a single interface. In this paper, we model the resources by random systems as in [29] or (conditional) probability distributions as in [33] .
Next, a converter is defined as a system to transform a resource into another resource. At a high level of abstraction, a converter system (or a converter) is an (abstract) system with two kinds of interfaces: inside interfaces which can be connected to interfaces of a resource, and combining a converter and a resource by the connection results in a new resource, and the outside interfaces, which can be provided as the new interfaces of the combined resource. Specifically, we write π i (R) (i ∈ I) to denote a combined resource 3 from a resource R and a converter π i where the inside interface of π i is connected to the i -interface of R. A set of converters π = {π i } i∈Ĩ indexed by a subsetĨ ⊆ I is called a protocol, and the combined resource is denoted by π(R) which is constructed by connecting π i to R for each i ∈Ĩ. For converters or protocols, two kinds of composition are naturally defined: For converters (or protocols) π and φ, their sequential composition, denoted by φ • π, is defined by (φ • π)R := φ(π(R)) for a resource R; In contrast, parallel composition of converters (or protocols) π and φ, denoted by πφ, is defined by (πφ)(RS) := π(R)φ(S) for resources R, S. In this paper, we deal with a symmetric-key encryption protocol and a key agreement protocol in the form π = {π A , π B }: a symmetric-key encryption protocol is designed to construct a secure channel resource from an authenticated channel resource and a key sharing resource, while a key agreement protocol is designed to construct a uniform key sharing resource from an authenticated channel resource and correlated randomness resource, where the resources mentioned above are defined in Section III-B.
Third, a distinguisher (or an environment) is a system to measure the similarity or difference between two resources by sending and/or receiving information via the interfaces of the resources. Specifically, we are interested in the best distinguishing advantage (i.e., a quantity) for two resources among a certain class of distinguishers. At a high level of abstraction, for a set of resources, a pseudo-metric (or a pseudo-distance) d : × → R + , where R + is the set of nonnegative real numbers, is considered to describe the best distinguishing advantage.
Then, the definition of composable security in the framework of constructive cryptography is given as follows.
Definition 5: Let be a set of resources, and let d be a pseudo-metric on . For resources R, S ∈ , we say that a protocol π constructs S from R within error ∈ [0, 1], denoted by R π, ⇒ S, if the following two conditions are satisfied.
converter that blocks the E-interface when it is attached to the E-interface of a resource. 3 We may use π i R or Rπ i for π i (R) with the same meaning, if there is no confusion. Moreover, we consider resources and converters such that converter application at different interfaces commutes: it holds that π i 1 π
2) Security: There exists a converter called a simulator σ such that d (π(R), σ (S)) ≤ when it is attached to the E-interface of the resource S. The two conditions, Availability and Security, in the above definition are explained as follows: the former explains that the two resources' behaviors are almost similar in the mode where the adversary Eve is not present, and the latter explains that their behaviors are almost similar in the other mode where Eve is present and makes use of her powers.
Composability of resources is described as follows. Let be a set of resources, and let be a set of protocols. For R, R , S, S , T ∈ and π, π , φ ∈ , it holds that: [30] (see [31] for more abstract context) that the above composable properties (i) and (ii) are satisfied if the underlying pseudo-metric on satisfies the following conditions:
In this paper, we model resources by (discrete) random systems or (conditional) probability distributions as mentioned previously. Therefore, a resource R ∈ is expressed by P R Y |X (or P Y |X for simplicity) where random variables X and Y denote input and output of R, respectively, 4 observed by distinguishers via the interfaces of R. Moreover, we denote the execution of P R Y |X with the given input X by P R Y |X [P X ] in this paper, and it is equal to the joint distribution P XY , that is, P R Y |X [P X ] = P XY . In addition, since we focus on information -theoretic security of resources and protocols, we consider the best distinguishing advantage among all unbounded distinguishers. Hence, we consider a pseudo-metric on given by the statistical distance as follows: For R, S ∈ ,
where the last equality follows from Proposition 10. Note that d given by (13) becomes a pseudo-metric on , because the statistical distance satisfies the mathematical properties of the metric (see Proposition 1). Furthermore, in this modeling, the composable security of both sequential and parallel composition is guaranteed, because d given by (13) satisfies the conditions (11) and (12) (see Propositions 7 and 8, respectively, for the details). 
B. Description of Resources
We describe several resources, such as channel and secret key, which are used for discussion in this paper. As discussed in the previous subsection, we describe the resources by (conditional) probability distributions. In the following text, ⊥ denotes some constant, and ε denotes the empty string. 5
• An authenticated channel resource (or an authenticated channel) from Alice to Bob usable once, denoted by P Auth( A→B) , takes a message (or a plaintext) X as an input at the A-interface, and outputs it at the B-interface without any error or replacement. If Eve is not present, it outputs nothing, i.e., ε, at the E-interface. If Eve is present, it outputs X at the E-interface by which Eve also obtains X. Specifically, if Eve is present, P Auth( A→B) is defined by the conditional probability as follows: For arbitrary x, y, z,
where X, Y , and Z are random variables observed at the A-interface, B-interface, and E-interface, respectively. Note that the execution of P Auth( A→B) with input X is P Auth( A→B) [P X ] = P XY Z with the random variables X, Y, Z above, and it is depicted in Fig. 1 . Similarly, an authenticated channel from Bob to Alice is defined, and it is denoted by P Auth( A←B) . 5 We distinguish the meaning of the symbols ⊥ and ε, and we use them to indicate the existence and non-existence of some information, respectively. For example, when a secure channel resource (resp., a uniform key sharing resource) outputs ⊥ (i.e., a constant), it is understood that ⊥ is typically the bit-length of a plaintext (resp., that of a shared secret key). In contrast, for example, when the ⊥ E blocking E-interface of a resource outputs ε, it is understood that ⊥ E outputs nothing at the E-interface.
• A secure channel resource (or a secure channel) from Alice to Bob usable once, denoted by P Sec( A→B) , takes a message (or a plaintext) X as an input at the A-interface and outputs it at the B-interface without any error or replacement. If Eve is not present, it outputs ε at the E-interface. If Eve is present, it outputs ⊥ at the E-interface, where ⊥ denotes a static parameter of the system, typically the (bit-)length of a plaintext. Specifically, if Eve is present, P Sec( A→B) is defined by the conditional probability as follows: For arbitrary x, y, z,
where X, Y , and Z are random variables observed at the A-interface, B-interface, and E-interface, respectively. The execution of P Sec( A→B) with input X is P Sec( A→B) [P X ] = P XY Z with the random variables X, Y, Z above, and it is depicted in Fig. 2 . • A uniform key sharing resource between Alice and Bob usable once, denoted by P UKS takes nothing (i.e., ε) as input at both the A-interface and B-interface, and outputs a uniformly random key k from a finite set K at both the interfaces. If Eve is not present, it outputs ε at the E-interface. If Eve is present, it outputs ⊥ at the E-interface, where it denotes a static parameter of the system, typically the (bit-)length of shared keys. Specifically, if Eve is present, P UKS outputs x, y, z at the A-interface, B-interface, E-interface, respectively, with the following joint probability
The uniform key sharing resource P UKS in the case where Eve is present is depicted in Fig. 3 (a). If this key k is chosen according to a distribution P K over K, i.e., not necessarily the uniform distribution, we call it a key sharing resource, and it is denoted by P KS K . Specifically, P KS K outputs x, y, and z at the A-interface, B-interface and E-interface, respectively, with the following joint probability
The key sharing resource P KS K in the case where Eve is present is depicted in Fig. 3 
(b). • A correlated randomness resource between Alice and
Bob usable once, denoted by P CR XY , takes nothing as input at the A-interface and B-interface, respectively, and outputs a key x (resp., a key y) from a finite set X (resp., a finite set Y) at the A-interface (resp., B-interface) such that (x, y) ∈ X × Y is randomly generated according to a distribution P XY . If Eve is not present, it outputs ε at the E-interface. If Eve is present, it outputs ⊥ at the E-interface, where it denotes a static parameter of the system, typically (bit-)length of correlated keys to be delivered to Alice and Bob. If Eve is present, P CR XY outputs x, y, and z at the A-interface, B-interface and E-interface, respectively, with the following joint probability
The key sharing resource P CR XY in the case where Eve is present is depicted in Fig. 4 .
IV. SYMMETRIC-KEY ENCRYPTION: SECURITY FORMALIZATIONS REVISITED
We explain the symmetric-key encryption under consideration in this paper, which is described using the notation in Section III. The traditional and classical model of symmetrickey encryption is also included as a special case in our scope. Using the static parameter 6 of a system, we suppose that finite sets of plaintexts and ciphertexts are determined and they are denoted by M and C, respectively, in the following. In addition, let M and C be random variables which take plaintexts in M and ciphertexts in C, respectively.
Let P KS K be a key sharing resource between Alice and Bob, and let P Auth( A→B) be an authenticated channel from Alice to Bob. Then, a symmetric-key encryption protocol π = {π A enc , π B dec }, where π A enc (resp., π B dec ) is a converter at Alice's side (resp., Bob's side), connected to P KS K P Auth( A→B) is defined as Protocol 1:
Each of π A enc and π B dec takes a key k ∈ K as input by accessing P KS K (via an inside interface). 2) π A enc computes c = π A enc (k, m) and sends c to π B dec by P Auth( A→B) . 3) π B dec computesm = π B dec (k, c) and outputsm.
Furthermore, for the random variables M and K , we definẽ M := π B dec (K , π A enc (K , M)) which is a random variable taking values in M.
In this paper, we call the resulting resourceπ := π (P KS K P Auth( A→B) ) a symmetric-key encryption system, while π is called a symmetric-key encryption protocol. In the following text, for simplicity, we denote a symmetric-key encryption system byπ, if there is no confusion from the context. Then, the execution ofπ with input M is described by a joint distribution Pπ MMC , and it is depicted in Fig. 5 .
In the traditional and classical model of symmetric-key encryption, P KS K corresponds to a key generation algorithm, and that π A enc and π B dec correspond to an encryption algorithm and a decryption algorithm, respectively. However, we deal with the symmetric-key encryption with more generality, i.e., without discussing how each component resource is constructed, by describing its execution by means of a probability distribution in the framework of constructive cryptography. Specifically, all systems whose execution is described by probability distributions can be applied in our scope. 7 In this paper, we deal with symmetric-key encryption systems in a general setting: each of π A enc and π B dec can be deterministic or probabilistic, and a decryption-error may not be zero. Moreover, we consider a setting 8 where a symmetrickey encryption system is usable for one time, since it is simple and fundamental in information-theoretic cryptography. We define ENC to be the set of all symmetric-key encryption systemsπ = π (P KS K P Auth( A→B) ) constructed by all possible symmetric-key encryption protocols π, key sharing resources P KS K , and authenticated channels P Auth( A→B) . Remark 1: In the following sections, for a finite set M arbitrarily fixed by a static parameter, we will consider all distributions over M with full support only, i.e., arbitrary P M ∈ P(M), and will not consider all distributions P M ∈ P(M). This is done for the following reasons:
• For discussing asymptotic security and its relationships in Section V-B, the parameter will be considered to be variable. Then, it is important to argue the (bit-)size of plaintexts, |M| or log |M|, and its relationships to security quantities, when the parameter goes to infinity. If we consider all probability distributions P M ∈ P(M) including a distribution not having full support, we cannot exactly discuss how the (bit-)size of plaintexts in the systems increases depending on the parameter. • We can discuss all the formalizations (which appear from Section IV-A to IV-D) and their relationships (in Theorem 1) in the setting of P(M) in a similar way as those in the setting of P(M). Moreover, the relationships obtained in Theorem 1 hold even in the setting of P(M). Therefore, there will be no difference between the cases P(M) and P(M) for the results in non-asymptotic case, while in an asymptotic case we need to consider P(M) as discussed previously. In the following text, we revisit the formalizations of several information-theoretic security notions for symmetrickey encryption systems. We consider 3 formalizations for the 7 We can apply the case where P KS K is a quantum key distribution system and π is OTP (one-time pad). 8 This model is often called the one-time model. 
are formalizations of correctness, and j,π (1 ≤ j ≤ 11) are formalizations of security defined in the following subsections.
In the following subsections, each of δ i,π and j,π will be formalized in terms of the notions, such as Traditional Security (TS), Indistinguishability (IND), Semantic Security (SS), or Composable Security (CS), and they are summarized in Tables II and III . Hereafter, we often use X j,π (resp., δ X i,π ) instead of j,π (resp., δ i,π ), where X ∈ {TS, IND, SS, CS}, so that readers can immediately understand the kind of security j,π (resp., δ i,π ) denoted by looking at X.
A. Traditional Security
) be a symmetric-key encryption system. The notion of correctness of the system denotes that π B dec outputs the underlying plaintext correctly except for a small error probability (i.e., decryption-error). Specifically, Pr{M =M} ≤ δ for a small δ. This requirement is fundamental in the system, and we consider the condition for all distributions of plaintexts rather than a particular distribution (e.g., the uniform distribution of plaintexts) because we intend to designπ so as to minimize the worst-case error probability. This leads to the formalization
The perfect secrecy forπ is originally formalized by Shannon [42] , based on the observation that the observed ciphertext C = c ∈ C does not leak any information on the underlying plaintext M. When an adversary Eve obtains the ciphertext c, she guesses the underlying message m by using the probability distribution P M|C=c . Hence, if this conditional probability distribution is the same as P M , we can state that the adversary has no advantage by obtaining the ciphertext. Hence, we can state that P M|C=c = P M for all c ∈ C is an expression for the perfect secrecy. This formalization implies that the perfect secrecy is equivalent to the independency between C and M.
Based on this formalization, several variants can be considered: First, the independency between C and M can be represented by H (M|C) = H (M), or equivalently, I (M; C) = 0. Furthermore, as an extended (or a relaxed) version, we can also consider I (M; C) ≤ for some small quantity in a natural way. This leads to the following formalization of security:
The above type of formalization has been utilized in many papers, and is not discussed in this paper.
We are interested in the independency of M and C, and the relation I (M; C) = D(P MC P M P C ), so it is natural to consider another measure between P MC and P M P C for quantifying the independency. Specifically, (P MC , P M P C ) ≤ for arbitrarily small ≥ 0 can be a variant of the traditional perfect secrecy. Therefore, we consider the formalization
For instance, this type of security is considered in [24] .
Returning to the original observation by Shannon, the requirement P M|C=c = P M for all c ∈ C can be relaxed to the formalization such that (P M|C=c , P M ) ≤ for all c ∈ C and an arbitrarily small ≥ 0. For instance, this type of security is considered in [45] and [44] . Furthermore, recalling the symmetry of independency in mutual information, i.e., I (C; M) = I (M; C) ≤ in the first variant, it is natural to consider the criterion (P C|M=m , P C ) ≤ for all m ∈ M and an arbitrarily small ≥ 0. We can interpret this kind of formalization in the following manner: every plaintext generates almost the same distribution of the ciphertexts, and hence, it is difficult to find the difference among each plaintext from the distribution of the ciphertext. Meanwhile, several readers may think that this formalization is artificial even if it has mathematically dual form with (P M|C=c , P M ) ≤ . However, interestingly, it will turn out later that this definition has direct connection with statistical indistinguishability, specifically, only the quantity (P C|M=m , P C ) among the TS formalizations will be equal to the quantity of the statistical indistinguishability. Recalling that the computational indistinguishability can be obtained by restricting the class of arbitrary binary functions in statistical indistinguishability to the family of polynomial-size circuit family, the computational security is essentially connected to this TS formalization. Hence, we include this definition in the variants of formalization of perfect secrecy. In summary, we consider the following formalizations from the above discussion:
In the four kinds of security formalizations above, it is clear that all the above quantities are equal to zero, i.e., TS 1,π = TS 2,π = TS 3,π = TS 4,π = 0 when we require that M and C are statistically independent and vice versa. Hence, in the following text, we are particularly interested in the case where these values are arbitrarily small but positive.
B. Indistinguishability
The notion of indistinguishability is traditionally described from the viewpoint of an adversary Eve. We first define the following indistinguishability described from Eve's advantage by means of the statistical distance:
This quantity represents the amount of difference between the probability distributions of the two ciphertexts corresponding to the plaintexts m and m . It becomes harder to distinguish m and m if the distributions of ciphertexts corresponding to them become closer. Specifically, it is hard to distinguish m and m when IND 5,π is small. Furthermore, IND 6 ,π below provides another interpretation of the information-theoretic indistinguishability by means of a predicate because Eve's advantage for distinguishing the views is described by the use of a predicate f (i.e., a binary function) arbitrarily chosen by Eve. This definition has a similar form 9 of the indistinguishability by Goldwasser and Micali [21] :
Similarly to the case of TS 4,π , i.e., by exchanging the roles of the plaintext and the ciphertext in IND 5,π , we can consider the following another formalization of information-theoretic analogue of indistinguishability:
C. Semantic Security
The formalization based on information-theoretic analogue of semantic security by Goldwasser and Micali [21] corresponds to the security definition as follows:
where G f is a binary random variable that only depends on f , but is independent of P M and h. Intuitively, the above formalization of semantic security implies that a ciphertext C is almost useless to obtain any one bit information of the underlying plaintext M; and Eve's advantage SS 8, π implies that, there is no difference in the success probabilities in guessing one bit information h(M) between by using the ciphertext C with a mapping f and by using f only with a random coin.
It is pointed out in [21] that the semantic security is considered as polynomially bounded perfect secrecy. Furthermore, it is also claimed in [41] that, if SS 8,π = 0, the security formalization of semantic security given by (14) is equivalent to perfect secrecy. However, they do not give any rigorous proof on these security reductions, and hence, we are interested in the relation of polynomially unbounded semantic security (14) to (relaxed) perfect secrecy when SS 8,π ≥ 0 in general. As a result, we will demonstrate that the semantic security is strictly weaker than the (relaxed) perfect secrecy in a certain setting, even if it is polynomially unbounded.
A generalization of the security formalization of (14) is known as entropic security [41] , which is defined by replacing the range of P M ∈ P(M) in (14) with
for some real number t ≥ 0. However, this formalization with t > 0 is outside the scope of this paper because we consider security for all distributions in P(M) (or P(X )) throughout this work.
D. Composable Security
The composable security is roughly described as the indistinguishability between real and ideal systems from the viewpoint of a distinguisher (or an environment), while the traditional indistinguishability is described from the viewpoint of Eve, as discussed previously. We concretely describe the formalization in Definition 5 by using (conditional) probability distributions.
First, Availability in Definition 5 corresponds to the correctness that we consider in this paper, and it is formalized by
The meaning of the formalization given by (15) is explained by using Fig. 6 : The dotted box in Fig. 6(a) is Pπ MM , the execution of a real systemπ, where the box Pπ MMC is the same as that in Fig. 5 , and the dotted box in Fig. 6 
the formalization of availability in the ideal secure channel, 10 where ⊥ E is the converter that blocks the E-interface. The quantity δ CS 2,π measures the difference between the two by means of the statistical distance.
Another possible formalization of Availability in Definition 5 is given by ). (16) The meaning of the formalization given by (16) is explained by Fig. 7 : The dotted box in Fig. 7(a) is Pπ MMC , where the inside of the dotted box is constructed as in Fig. 5 , and the dotted box in Fig. 7 
is also understood simply as P Sec( A→B) in the mode where Eve is not present. of security in the ideal secure channel, where P Sim Q is a simulator that takes ⊥ as input 11 and outputs a certain Q at the E-interface which is independent from M.
Therefore, we note that P Ideal-ENC
The quantity CS 9,π measures the difference between the two by means of the statistical distance. Briefly speaking, CS 9,π is the difference between the two resource systems by observing both outputs at the B-interface and the E-interface when M is an input at the A-interface. However, we note that the correctness formalization δ CS 2,π already captures the difference between the two systems by observing the B-interface when M is input at the A-interface. Hence, as another security formalization, it may be considered enough to evaluate the difference between the two systems by only observing the E-interface when M is an input at the A-interface, without observing the B-interface. This leads to the following formalization of security: 
The quantity CS 10,π in (17) measures the difference between the two systems Pπ MC and P Ideal-ENC M Q which are illustrated in Fig. 8 : The box by solid lines in Fig. 8(a) shows the execution ofπ with input M, denoted by Pπ MC , and the box in Fig. 8(b) is the formalization in the ideal secure channel, denoted by P Ideal-ENC M Q = P M P Q . Interestingly, Dodis [15] considered the simulation-based formalization
for arbitrary M and arbitrary unbounded Eve's strategy E :
Although it is not considered in the context of composable security, the LHS of (18) is the same as CS 10,π by (2). Moreover, one more possible formalization instead of CS 10,π is given by CS 11,π := inf P Q ∈P(C) max m∈M (Pπ C|M=m , P Sim Q ). 11 Here, ⊥ denotes a constant, which usually represents the (bit-)length of a plaintext.
The formalization above is considered in terms of all possible elements in M instead of all possible distributions over M, similar to those considered in δ CS 3,π .
V. SYMMETRIC-KEY ENCRYPTION: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FORMALIZATIONS OF CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY A. Relationships Between Formalizations
We show the explicit (i.e., non-asymptotic) relationships between formalizations of Type(i, j )-security for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 11. Recall that ENC is the set of all symmetric-key encryption systemsπ = π (P KS K P Auth( A→B) ) constructed by all possible symmetric-key encryption protocols π, key sharing resources P KS K , and authenticated channels P Auth( A→B) .
Theorem 1: For any symmetric-key encryption system π ∈ ENC , we have the following explicit (i.e., nonasymptotic) relationships between the formalizations of correctness and security.
(i) Correctness formalizations: δ TS 1,π = δ CS 2,π = δ CS 3,π , (ii) TS formalizations:
max{ CS 10,π , δ CS 2,π } ≤ CS 9,π ≤ CS 10,π + δ CS 2,π , CS 10,π = CS 11,π , (v) TS and IND formalizations: (1/2) TS 2,π ≤ CS 10,π ≤ IND 5,π . The rest of this subsection, Section V-A, is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1. The relationships (i)-(vii) in Theorem 1 are proven by Lemmas 1-9 as follows (see also Table IV) : (i) is proven by Lemma 1; (ii) is proven by Lemmas 2 and 9; (iii) is proven by Lemma 3; (iv) is proven by Lemmas 4 and 5;
(v) is proven by Lemma 6; (vi) is proven by Lemma 7; and (vii) is proven by Lemma 8.
Remark 2: As discussed in Remark 1, all the relationships in Theorem 1 hold even in the setting of P(M), and in this setting several parts of the proofs will be simpler: it is sufficient to take γ = 0 instead of taking arbitrary γ > 0 in the proofs of Lemmas 6, 7, and 8, and Proposition 10 used in Lemmas 1 and 5. However, the above relationships will also be used in the analysis of asymptotic security in Section V-B, and we need the proofs in the setting of considering P(M).
Lemma 1: For anyπ ∈ ENC , we have δ TS 1,π = δ CS 2,π = δ CS 3,π . Proof: First, for anyπ and for any distribution P M , we have (P M M , P MM ) = Pr{M =M} by Corollary 2. By this, it is straightforward to have δ TS 1,π = δ CS 2,π . Second, the equality δ CS 2,π = δ CS 3,π immediately follows from Proposition 10.
Lemma 2: For anyπ ∈ ENC , we have
Proof: First, we show (2/ln 2)( TS 2,π ) 2 ≤ TS 1,π ≤ 2 TS 2,π log (|M|/(2 TS 2,π )): From Proposition 6, it follows that, for any P M ∈ P(M) and anyπ ∈ ENC ,
Therefore, we have
Meanwhile, from Corollary 1, it follows that, for any P M ∈ P(M) and anyπ ∈ ENC ,
Therefore, by taking the supremum, we have TS 1,π ≥ 2( TS 2,π ) 2 / ln 2. Secondly, we show TS 2,π ≤ TS 3,π : For an arbitrary distribution P M ∈ P(M), we have
Therefore, we obtain TS 2,π ≤ TS 3,π . Similarly, we can show that, for an arbitrary distribution P M ∈ P(M),
which implies that TS 2,π ≤ TS 4,π . Lemma 3: For anyπ ∈ ENC , we have IND 5,π = IND 6,π . Proof: By equality (2), we have max m,m ∈M
Proof: For any distributions P M ∈ P(M) and P Q ∈ P(C), we have = δ CS 2,π + CS 10,π .
In addition, from Proposition 3, it is clear that (P MC , P M P Q ) ≤ (P MMC , P M M P Q ) for any P M ∈ P(M) and P Q ∈ P(C). Therefore, we obtain
Similarly, we have δ CS 2,π ≤ inf P Q sup P M (P MMC , P M M P Q ).
Lemma 5: For anyπ ∈ ENC , we have CS 10,π = CS 11,π . Proof: For arbitrary distributions P Q ∈ P(C) and P M ∈ P(M), we set X := M, Y := C, and Z := Q, and use Proposition 10. Then, we have sup P M (P MC , P M P Q ) = max m (P C|M=m , P Q ). Therefore, by taking the infimum over all P Q ∈ P(C), we have CS 10,π = CS 11,π . Lemma 6: For anyπ ∈ ENC , we have TS 3,π = IND 5,π and TS 4,π ≤ IND 7,π ≤ 2 TS 4,π .
Proof: We show TS 3,π = IND 5,π : Observe for every m ∈ M that
First, we prove TS 3,π ≤ IND 5,π : For arbitrary P M , let m 0 := arg max m (P C|M=m , P C ). Then, from (19) we have max m∈M (P C|M=m , P C )
Hence, by taking the supremum over all P M ∈ P(M), we get TS 3,π ≤ IND 5,π . Next, we show TS 3,π ≥ IND 5,π : Let m 0 , m 1 ∈ M such that IND 5,π = (P C|M=m 0 , P C|M=m 1 ). For arbitrary > 0, we define
where γ is a positive real number such that γ IND 5,π ≤ . Then, by substituting both m = m 0 and P M (m ) into (19), we obtain IND 3,π ≥ (P C|M=m 0 , P C )
The inequality TS 4,π ≤ IND 7,π can be proven in a similar way as TS 3,π ≤ IND 5,π . What remains to be shown is IND 7,π ≤ 2 TS 4,π and this is proven as follows: For arbitrary P M ∈ P(M), and for arbitrary c, c ∈ C, we have
By taking the supremum over all P M ∈ P(M), we obtain IND 7,π ≤ 2 TS 4,π . Lemma 7: For anyπ ∈ ENC , we have SS 8,π ≤ IND 6,π ≤ 4 SS 8,π . Proof: First, we prove SS 8,π ≤ IND 6,π . This part can be proven similarly as in [19] , although the proof in [19] is given in the computational security setting. Suppose that a distribution P M and functions f : C → {0, 1}, h : M → {0, 1} are arbitrarily given. Let P M * be the independent and identical distribution according to P M . Then, we consider the random variable G f which is
defined by 
, and hence we have
Therefore, we obtain
where the last inequality follows from (22) and (23) .
By applying X = f (C) and Y = h(M) in Proposition 11 to inequality (21) , it holds that
for arbitrarily given P M ∈ P(M), f : C → {0, 1}, and h : M → {0, 1}. In particular, we choose m 0 , m 1 ∈ M by which IND 6,π is given. Then, for arbitrary > 0, we consider
where γ is a positive real number with γ ≤ 2, and take h :
Then, from (24) it follows that
Here, we have (26) , as shown at the top of the next page, where δ 1 = c: f (c)=1 P C|M (c|m 1 ) and δ 2 = (|M| − 2) −1 m =m 0 ,m 1 c: f (c)=1 P C|M (c|m), and 0 ≤ δ i ≤ 1 for every i . Therefore, by (25) and (26), we get
where the last inequality follows from |δ 1 − δ 2 | ≤ 1 and γ /2 ≤ . Lemma 8: For anyπ ∈ ENC , we have (1/2) TS 2,π ≤ CS 10,π ≤ IND 5,π . Proof: First, we prove (1/2) TS 2,π ≤ CS 10,π by the following argument: For an arbitrary distribution P Q ∈ P(C) and P M ∈ P(M), we have
Then, it follows that TS 2,π ≤ 2 CS 10,π . Next, we show CS 10,π ≤ IND 5,π : By Lemma 5, it is sufficient to prove CS 11,π ≤ IND 5,π . Let m 0 ∈ M be a plaintext such that it gives CS 11,π , and set P Q := P C|M=m 1 by choosing m 1 ∈ M with m 1 = m 0 . Then, we have CS 11,π ≤ (P C|M=m 0 , P Q ) = (P C|M=m 0 , P C|M=m 1 )
Lemma 9: For anyπ ∈ ENC , we have TS 3,π ≤ 2 TS 2,π . Proof: By Lemma 6, it is sufficient to prove IND 5,π ≤ 2 TS 2,π . For any > 0, and for m 0 , m 1 ∈ M such that IND 5,π = (P C|M=m 0 , P C|M=m 1 ), we define a distribution PM ∈ P(M) by
where γ is a positive real number such that γ IND 5,π ≤ 2. Then, we have TS 2,π ≥ (PMĈ , PM PĈ )
B. Asymptotic Security and Its Relationships
We discuss the asymptotic behaviors of symmetric-key encryption systems, namely, asymptotic security and its relationships. A cryptographic system with computational security usually takes a parameter κ ∈ N as an input, called a security parameter, and security of the system is discussed in terms of sufficiently large κ in an asymptotic manner. Even in the information-theoretic security, we can discuss similarly, that is, the bit-length (or cardinality of sets) of plaintexts and ciphertexts or targeted security level will be a function of such a parameter κ ∈ N. In the previous sections, a static parameter is implicit, which determines several parameters of the systems, for instance, a set K for key sharing resources, sets X , Y for correlated randomness resources, sets M, C for encryption protocols, and the symbol ⊥ (usually a constant) input/output by several systems, such as P Sec( A→B) and P UKS . In this section, we consider the parameter κ as being a variable parameter of symmetric-key encryption systems, or equivalently, we consider a set of systems {π κ } κ∈N ⊆ ENC , which corresponds to the notion of asymptotic systems in [33, Section 1.3.5]. For simplicity, we consider a representative systemπ κ (for sufficiently large κ ∈ N) to indicate a set of systems {π κ } κ∈N in this paper. In the following text, we will discuss several types of asymptotic security and their relationships with respect to κ ∈ N. We formally provide the following definition.
Definition 7: A symmetric-key encryption systemπ κ is said to be asymptotically Type(i, j )-secure, if (δ i,π κ , j,π κ ) → (0, 0) as κ → ∞, i.e., δ i,π κ = o(1) and j,π κ = o(1).
In the following, for simplicity, we often writeπ forπ κ , if there is no confusion from the context. A symmetric-key encryption systemπ κ ∈ ENC having asymptotic security is described by δ i,π κ = o(1) and j,π κ = o(1) for some i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 11 (i.e., asymptotic Type(i, j )-security). Moreover, Theorem 1 shows that all δ i,π κ (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) are the same in the formalization of correctness, while all j,π κ (1 ≤ j ≤ 11) are not of the same order in the formalization of security. Therefore, we classify the symmetric-key encryption systems having asymptotic security into the following three classes, depending on the relationships between j,π κ (1 ≤ j ≤ 11):
Specifically, ENC-I is the set of symmetric-key encryption systems satisfying the asymptotic Type(i, j )-security for all i, j except for j = 1, 4, 7, because all j,π κ (1 ≤ j ≤ 11 and j = 1, 4, 7) are of the same order in the formalization of security by Theorem 1; ENC-II is the set of systems satisfying the asymptotic Type(i, 1)-security for all i ; and ENC-III is the set of systemsπ κ satisfying the asymptotic Type(i, j )-security for all i and j = 4, 7, because TS 4,π κ and IND 7,π κ are of the same order by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 shows that ENC-II ⊆ ENC-I and ENC-III ⊆ ENC-I . In this subsection, we show that:
(i) There are gaps between ENC-I and ENC-II , and between ENC-I and ENC-III . Specifically, it holds that ENC-II ENC-I and ENC-III ENC-I (see Theorem 3); (ii) We clarify a certain sufficient condition on systemsπ ∈ ENC-I to satisfyπ ∈ ENC-II (see Theorem 4), and we also show a certain sufficient condition on systemsπ ∈ ENC-I to satisfyπ ∈ ENC-III (see Theorem 5) .
First, we characterize the conditional distributions of symmetric-key encryption systems by a certain type of matrices. For a symmetric-key encryption systemπ ∈ ENC , we denote it by Pπ C|M , an |C| × |M| transition probability matrix associated with {P C|M (c|m)} c∈C,m∈M ofπ, i.e., each entry of Pπ C|M corresponds to P C|M (c|m) for c ∈ C and m ∈ M inπ. The following theorem states a mathematical condition of Pπ C|M for a symmetric-key encryption systemπ, and it will be later used to show gaps between security definitions.
Theorem 2: For any symmetric-key encryption system π ∈ ENC satisfying δ TS 1,π = 0 and |C| = |M|, its probability transition matrix Pπ C|M is doubly stochastic. 12 Conversely, for any n × n matrix A which is doubly stochastic, there exists a symmetric-key encryption system π = π (P KS K P Auth( A→B) ) ∈ ENC such that |C| = |M| = n, δ TS 1,π = 0, and Pπ C|M = A. Proof: In the case of |M| = |C|, there exists a bijection f k : M → C since every ciphertext c ∈ C can be uniquely decrypted by k ∈ K if k ∈ K is fixed. Hence, for each k ∈ K, let F k ∈ {0, 1} n×n be a permutation matrix, which corresponds to the bijection f k . Then, it is easy to see that the probability 12 An n × n probability transition matrix P = ( p i, j ) is said to be doubly stochastic if i p i, j = j p i, j = 1 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
transition matrix can be represented as
which is doubly stochastic. Conversely, due to the Birkhoffvon Neumann Theorem [7] , [48] , there exists a pair of P K (k) and F k (k ∈ K) satisfying (27) if Pπ C|M is doubly stochastic.
Next, the following theorem shows that there are gaps among the three classes, ENC-I , ENC-II , and ENC-III . The proof concept is to construct a counterexample of a symmetric-key encryption system, which is essentially completed by considering a doubly stochastic matrix due to Theorem 2.
Theorem 3: It holds that (i) ENC-I = ENC-II , and (ii) ENC-I = ENC-III . More precisely, we have the following gaps between the formalizations of security.
(i) Suppose that = o(1) and = (1/ log n) for n ∈ N. Then, there exists a symmetric-key encryption systemπ ∈ ENC satisfying the following conditions: IND 5,π = , n = |M|,π is asymptotically Type(i, 5)secure, but not asymptotically Type(i, 1)-secure for arbitrary 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
(ii) Suppose that = o(1) and = (1/n) for n ∈ N. Then, there exists a symmetric-key encryption systemπ ∈ ENC satisfying the following conditions: IND 5,π = , n = |M|,π is asymptotically Type(i, 5)secure, but not asymptotically Type(i, 4)-secure for arbitrary 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
Proof: For arbitrary and any positive integer n, we consider an n × n matrix A = (a i j ) defined by
Then, it holds that j a i j = 1 for every i , and i a i j = 1 for every j , which shows that A is doubly stochastic. Therefore, by Theorem 2, it follows that there exists a symmetric-key encryption systemπ ∈ ENC such that |M| = |C| = n and Pπ C|M = A, where Pπ C|M is the probability transition matrix ofπ. Suppose that M = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n }, C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n }, and the (i, j )-entry of Pπ C|M is equal to P C|M (c i |m j ).
It is easy to see that (P C|M=m i , P C|M=m j ) = for every pair of m i , m j ∈ M with i = j . Hence, we have IND 5,π = , and by taking = o(1) it holds that
In the following text, we prove the statements (i) and (ii) by taking different orders of .
Proof of (i): We will show TS 1,π = (1), if = (1/ log n), by evaluating I (M; C) as follows. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have
In particular, we suppose that P M is uniform. Then, it follows that P C (c i ) = 1/n for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n from (30) , and hence, H (C) = log n. Furthermore, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have
Because P M is uniform, we have H (C|M) = H (C|M = m j ) for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and hence,
where the last equality follows from H (C) = log n and (31). Then, by taking such that = o(1) and = (1/ log n), the second and third terms of (32) converge to 0 as → 0 and n → ∞. However, the first term of (32) does not converge to 0, and I (M; C) = (1). Hence, we have
Therefore, the proof is completed by (29) and (33) . Proof of (ii): We will show TS 4,π = (1), if = (1/n), by evaluating a lower bound on TS 4,π as follows. For any distribution P M ∈ P(M), we have (P M|C=c j , P M )
In particular, in the case of a distribution P M with P M (m j ) = 1/2 and = (1/n), it holds that
Thus, we have
Therefore, the proof is completed by (29) and (35) . Theorem 1 shows that, ifπ belongs to ENC-II , thenπ also belongs to ENC-I (or equivalently, ENC-II ⊆ ENC-I ). However, the converse does not hold, as an counterexample is shown by Theorem 3 (i). Then, we can consider the following question: What is the condition on IND 5, π such that the converse does hold? Or, how fast does IND 5, π need to converge to zero for the converse to hold? The following theorem answers the question.
Theorem 4: Ifπ ∈ ENC-I satisfies a condition IND 5,π = o(1/ log |M|), we haveπ ∈ ENC-II .
Proof: By Theorem 1, we have
Now, we consider the following lemma. Theorem 4 indicates that IND 5,π = o(1/ log |M|) is a sufficient condition forπ ∈ ENC-II . In addition, we can see that the condition is tight; otherwise, there is a counterexample: by Theorem 3 (i), there existsπ ∈ ENC-I satisfyingπ ∈ ENC-II if IND 5,π = (1/ log |M|). Specifically, the tightness of the sufficient condition IND 5,π = o(1/ log |M|) is also explained because the underlying inequalities (36)-(38) are asymptotically tight 13 (i.e., tight up to a constant).
Similarly, Theorem 1 states that, ifπ belongs to ENC-III , thenπ also belongs to ENC-I (or equivalently, ENC-III ⊆ ENC-I ). Meanwhile, Theorem 3 (ii) states that the converse does not hold in general. Hence, we similarly consider the following question: How fast does IND 5, π need to converge to zero for the converse to hold? An answer to the question is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 5: Suppose thatπ ∈ ENC-I satisfies the condition
Then, we haveπ ∈ ENC-III . More generally, for arbitrary symmetric-key encryption systemπ, we have a bound
and it is asymptotically tight. Proof: The first statement follows from the second one because IND 4,π = o(1) if the condition (39) holds by the bound (40) . Therefore, it is sufficient to prove the bound (40) .
For any P M ∈ P(M), m ∈ M, and c ∈ Supp(P C ), we have |P C (c) − P C|M (c|m)| ≤ TS 3,π , which is equivalent to
since TS 3,π = IND 5,π by (v) of Theorem 1. For any P M ∈ P(M), and c ∈ Supp(P C ), it holds that
where the inequality (42) follows from (41) . By taking the supremum over P M ∈ P(M), the bound (40) is induced. Next, we show that the bound (40) is asymptotically tight by constructing a symmetric-key encryption system satisfying the bound with equality up to a constant. We consider a symmetric-key encryption systemπ whose probability transition matrix is defined by (28) . Then, we have IND 5, π = . In addition, it follows from (30) that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
If we set = 1/n, then for arbitrary P M ∈ P(M)
Hence, we obtain sup P M min c∈Supp( P C ) P C (c) −1 = (n). Therefore, the RHS of the inequality (40) is O(1), since IND 5,π = = 1/n. Meanwhile, the LHS of the inequality (40) is (1) by (35) . Therefore, the bound (40) is tight up to a constant.
Theorem 5 indicates that IND 5,π = o inf P M min c P C (c) is a sufficient condition forπ ∈ ENC-III , and it also shows that the condition is tight given that the underlying bound (40) is asymptotically tight.
C. Application of Relationships: Lower Bounds
In this subsection, as an application of our relationships in Theorem 1, we derive a family of lower bounds on the size of secret keys and security quantities required under all security definitions in a comprehensive manner. The concept is to apply the relationships in Theorem 1 to a single lower bound. In general, if we have a (upper or lower) bound under a certain type of security definition, we can derive a family of (upper or lower) bounds under other definitions in a comprehensive manner by utilizing the relationships.
In this paper, for the applied bound, we consider the lower bound (43) below shown by Pope [39] . For completeness, we provide the proof of Proposition 12 in Appendix A, which is proven by showing a slightly extended proposition from the original in [39] . Proposition 12 ([39] ): For a symmetric-key encryption systemπ ∈ ENC constructed by a key sharing resource over K, we have
We now derive a family of lower bounds on security quantities under all security formalizations in Definition 6 at once through relationships in Theorem 1 together with the bound (43) .
Proposition 13: For a symmetric-key encryption system π ∈ ENC constructed by a key sharing resource over K, we have the following lower bounds:
(i) δ i,π + j,π ≥ 1 − |K| |M| for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j ∈ {3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11}, (ii) δ i,π + 2 j,π ≥ 1 − |K| |M| for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j ∈ {2, 4, 7},
Proof: By Theorem 1, we have δ TS 1,π = δ CS 2,π = δ CS 3,π , CS 9,π ≤ CS 10,π + δ CS 2,π , CS 11,π = CS 10,π ≤ IND 5,π = TS 3,π = IND 6,π . Combining the above inequalities with (43) , we obtain (i).
In addition, by Theorem 1, we have TS 3,π ≤ 2 TS 2,π and TS 2,π ≤ TS 4,π ≤ IND 7,π . Therefore, we have (ii) by these inequalities and (i).
Similarly, the inequalities IND 6,π ≤ 4 SS 8,π and TS 2,π ≤ (ln 2/2) 1/2 ( TS 1,π ) 1/2 in Theorem 1 imply (iii) and (iv), respectively, by applying them to (i) and (ii).
By Proposition 13, we immediately obtain the following lower bounds on the size of secret keys.
Proposition 14: Suppose that a symmetric-key encryption system constructed by a key sharing resource over K is (δ, )-Type(i, j )-secure. Then, we have the following lower bounds: |M| for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j = 1. Proposition 14 shows the necessary conditions for the existence of (δ, )-Type(i, j )-secure symmetric-key encryption. By considering a contraposition of Proposition 14, we immediately obtain the following impossibility result on the parameters of symmetric-key encryption: No symmetrickey encryption system exists, which is (δ, )-Type(i, j )secure, if δ and are some real numbers such that they do not satisfy the corresponding inequality among (i)-(iv) in Proposition 14.
Finally, we remark several points about the lower bounds in Proposition 14. In this subsection, we have derived the lower bounds starting from Proposition 12 (i.e., the lower bound in Type(2, 9)-security) in combination with the relationships in Theorem 1. Here, we note that several lower bounds derived in the previous papers are actually captured as a part of the lower bounds in Proposition 14, which are explained as follows.
• The most famous lower bound is the Shannon's work which derives |K| ≥ |M| starting from the perfect secrecy I (M; C) = 0 and perfect correctness Pr{M =M} = 0. His result is captured by (iv) of Proposition 14, because his security definition corresponds to (0, 0)-Type(1, 1)-security. Furthermore, if = δ = 0 in arbitrary Type(i, j )-security, which is equivalent to both perfect correctness and perfect secrecy, we obtain the same bound |K| ≥ |M|. • The second lower bound is Dodis's work [15] which derives |K| ≥ (1 − δ − )|M|. Because his security definition corresponds to Type(1, 10)-security as mentioned in Section IV-D, this bound is captured by (i) of Proposition 14. However, interestingly, it should be noted that his proof technique is different from ours.
• The third lower bound is in [46, Exercise 8 .64] for a certain class of universal hash functions: Let a family of hash functions from S to T be = { r : S → T | r ∈ R} such that, each r is injective for each r ∈ R, and ( R (s), R (s )) ≤ for all s, s ∈ S, where R is the random variable with the uniform distribution over R. Then, it is derived that |R| ≥ (1 − )|S|. This result is captured by (i) of Proposition 14, since such a class of hash functions is equivalent to the following special class of symmetric-key encryption π = (π A enc , π B dec ) connected to P Auth( A→B) and P UKS over R:
-For every r ∈ R, π A enc (r, ·) from M to C is deterministic and injective; -For every r ∈ R, π B dec (r, ·) from C to M is defined by m := π B dec (r, c) if π A enc (r, m) = c. Note that such m ∈ M is uniquely determined, because π A enc (r, ·) is injective for every r ∈ R. Then, the condition required for corresponds to (0, )-Type(1, 5)-security, and |R| ≥ (1 − )|M| is the same as (i) of Proposition 14.
• Finally, we consider the tightness of lower bounds in Proposition 14. Note that the difference of the bounds (i)-(iii) in Proposition 14 lies in a certain constant with respect to . Meanwhile, Dodis [15] shows that his bound |K| ≥ (1 − δ − )|M| (i.e., (i) of Proposition 14) is tight with respect to δ and up to a constant. Therefore, all lower bounds (i)-(iii) in Proposition 14 are also tight with respect to δ and up to a constant. However, it would be open for the exact tightness of Proposition 14 for δ > 0 and > 0.
VI. KEY AGREEMENT
In this section, we discuss security formalizations and their relationships for key agreement in a similar way for symmetric-key encryption.
A. Protocol Execution
We explain the protocol execution of key agreement. Let X and Y be finite sets. Suppose that Alice and Bob can have access to a correlated randomness resource P CR XY , and that they can obtain x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, respectively, according to the probability distribution P XY . In addition, we assume that there is a bidirectional or unidirectional authenticated channel available between Alice and Bob (i.e., P Auth( A→B) and/or P Auth( A←B) ).
Let P UKS be the uniform key sharing resource between Alice and Bob over a finite set K. Furthermore, let T be a finite set of transcripts between Alice and Bob. Then, a key agreement protocol π = {π A ka , π B ka }, where π A ka (resp., π B ka ) is a converter at Alice's (resp., Bob's) side, connected to P CR XY and the authenticated channels is defined as follows. Let l be a positive integer and λ := 2l − 1, which denotes the number of communications between Alice and Bob. The converter π A ka consists of (probabilistic) functions f 1 , f 3 , . . . , f 2l−1 indexed by odd integers and g A , and the converter π B ka consists of (probabilistic) functions f 2 , f 4 , . . . , f 2l−2 indexed by even integers and g B , where the (probabilistic) functions 14 f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f λ , g A , g B are defined by (y, t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , . . . , t j −1 ) for j = 2, 4, . . . , 2l − 2, t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , . . . , t λ ) , (y, t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , . . . , t λ ) .
Then, the execution of π together with the correlated randomness resource and authenticated channels is described as follows: First, Alice and Bob obtain x ∈ X and y ∈ Y from the resource P CR XY , respectively. By using the above functions, Alice and Bob compute transcripts and perform interactive communications over the authenticated channels. Specifically, Alice sends some messages t 1 , t 3 , t 5 , . . ., indexed by odd integers, to Bob, while Bob sends some messages t 2 , t 4 , t 6 , . . ., indexed by even integers, to Alice. Finally, Alice (resp., Bob) obtains a key k A (resp., k B ) which is computed by the (probabilistic) function g A (resp., g B ) with all information x, (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t λ ) (resp., y, (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t λ )). The above execution is formally described as Protocol 2:
1) π A ka and π B ka take x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, respectively, as input by accessing P CR XY (via inside interfaces). 2) π A ka computes t 1 = f 1 (x) and sends t 1 to π B ka by P Auth( A→B) . 3) For s from 1 to (λ − 1)/2, 1. π B ka computes t 2s = f 2s (y, t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t 2s−1 ). Then, π B ka sends t 2s to π A ka by P Auth( A←B) . 2. π A ka computes t 2s+1 = f 2s+1 (x, t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t 2s ). Then, π A ka sends t 2s+1 to π B ka by P Auth( A→B) . 4) π A ka computes k A = g A (x, t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t λ ) and outputs k A . Similarly, π B ka computes k B = g B (y, t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t λ ) and outputs k B .
By the protocol execution mentioned above, we deal with key agreement in a general setting: each step of π A ka and π B ka can be deterministic or probabilistic, a key-agreement error may not be zero, and the number of authenticated communications is arbitrary. Specifically, if we want to consider a setting where only the unidirectional authenticated channel from Alice to Bob (resp., from Bob to Alice) is available, we ignore the functions f i for even i (resp., odd i ); if we are interested in the non-interactive key agreement, λ is set to be 1 and Step 3 is ignored.
In this paper, we use the following notation. For every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ λ, T i denotes a random variable that takes the values Fig. 9 . Execution ofπ = π(P CR XY P Auth ): the dotted box represents a probability distribution Pπ
t i ∈ T , and let T λ := (T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T λ ) be the joint random variable that takes the values t λ = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t λ ) ∈ T λ . Moreover, let K A and K B be the random variables that takes values k A ∈ K and k B ∈ K, respectively. In the following text, P Auth denotes the parallel composition of all authenticated channel resources used in the protocol execution. 15 For a key agreement protocol π, we call the resulting resourcê π := π(P CR XY P Auth ) a key agreement system in this paper, and we often denote it byπ simply. The execution ofπ is described by a probability distribution Pπ K A K B T λ , and it is depicted in Fig. 9 . We note that the above scenario of key agreement captures the model used in other papers such as [1] , [27] , and all systems whose execution is described by probability distributions can be in our scope without discussing how each component resource is constructed. In this paper, we define KA to be the set of all key agreement systemsπ = π(P CR XY P Auth ) constructed by all possible key agreement protocols π, correlated randomness resources P CR XY , and authenticated channels P Auth .
B. Security Definitions Revisited
Similar to Section IV, we revisit the formalizations of several information-theoretic security notions for key agreement systems. In this section, we consider 2 formalizations for the notion of correctness, and 5 formalizations for the notion of security, which means 10 formalizations are dealt with in this section. Before providing each formalization, we give the following definition of correctness and security for key agreement systems that captures all of the 10 formalizations in a comprehensive manner.
Definition 8: A key agreement systemπ ∈ KA is said to be (δ, )-Type(i, j )-secure for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 5, ifπ satisfies δ i,π ≤ δ and j,π ≤ , where δ i,π (1 ≤ i ≤ 2) are formalizations of correctness, and j,π (1 ≤ j ≤ 5) are formalizations of security defined in the following sections. 15 More precisely, P Auth = P Auth( A→B) · · · P Auth( A→B) l times P Auth( A←B) · · · P Auth( A←B) l−1 times . In the following sections, each of δ i,π and j,π will be formalized in terms of the notions, Traditional Security (TS) or Composable Security (CS), and they are summarized in Table V. 1) Traditional Security: As in the case of symmetric-key encryption systems, we first consider the following traditional formalization of security for key agreement systems (e.g., [1] , [11] , [12] , [17] , [27] , [28] , [35] ).
Definition 9: A key agreement systemπ ∈ KA is said to be -secure if it satisfies the following conditions:
In particular,π is said to be perfectly secure if = 0 above. The meaning of the formalizations (44)-(46) is as follows: The condition (44) means that the probability of agreementerrors between Alice and Bob is small; The second condition (45) means that the distribution of keys is almost uniform; and the last condition (46) means that an adversary Eve cannot obtain the information about the key by observing the transcripts between Alice and Bob, because K A and T λ are almost independent.
Note that the first two conditions in Definition 9 explain the correctness of the key agreement systemπ, and they should be satisfied even if Eve is not present. The last condition (46) is the security condition against Eve who can observe possible transcripts between Alice and Bob. Therefore, it is natural to consider the quantities, δ TS 1,π and TS 1,π below, to measure correctness and security for the key agreement systemπ: For correctness, we define δ TS 1,π := max{Pr{K A = K B }, log |K| − H (K A )}; For security, we define TS 1,π := I (K A ; T λ ).
Then, the traditional formalization in Definition 9 corresponds to (, )-Type(1, 1)-security.
Instead of TS 1,π , we can also measure the independence of K A and T λ by using the statistical distance, and hence we reach the formalization:
The third formalization of security which we focus on is as follows:
Intuitively, TS
3,π ≤ for small denotes that Eve cannot obtain the information about a shared key K A = k A , even if she can observe arbitrary transcripts t λ ∈ T λ between Alice and Bob. This formalization is an analogy to TS 4,π for a symmetric-key encryption systemπ . To the best of the authors' knowledge, it has not been dealt with in the context of key agreement at present. However, it is practically important to measure the leakage of the shared key from the transcripts in the worst case.
2) Composable Security: We consider the formalization in Definition 5 by using (conditional) probability distributions similar to in symmetric-key encryption systems.
First, we consider the formalization of Availability in Definition 5. Define Pπ K A K B := ⊥ E (Pπ K A K B T λ ), where ⊥ E is the converter that blocks the E-interface, and P Ideal-KA UU := ⊥ E (P UKS ), where U is the random variable associated with the uniform distribution P U over K. Then, we define
The meaning of the formalization above is explained by using Fig. 10 : In Fig. 10(a) , the dotted box is Pπ K A K B , the execution ofπ when Eve is not present; In Fig. 10(b) , the dotted box is P Ideal-KA UU , the execution of ideal uniform key sharing resource when Eve is not present. 16 The quantity δ CS 2,π measures the difference between the two systems using the statistical distance.
Second, we consider the formalization of Security in Definition 5. For an arbitrary simulator P Sim Q , let P Ideal-KA UU Q := P Sim Q (P UKS ). Then, we define CS 4,π := inf
UU Q
). 16 P Ideal-KA UU is also understood simply as P UKS in the mode where Eve is not present. by the dotted boxes, respectively: In Fig. 11(a) , the dotted box Pπ K A K B T λ is the same as that in Fig. 9 ; In Fig. 11(b) , the simulator P Sim Q takes ⊥ as an input, a constant typically indicating (bit-)length of shared keys. At the E-interface, it outputs Q, which is independent from U according to a certain distribution P Q ∈ P(T λ ).
Furthermore, as we considered in the case of symmetrickey encryption systems, if a distinguisher observes only the A-interface and E-interface without observing the B-interface, we reach the formalization below:
where
). Fig. 12 illustrates Pπ K A T λ and P Ideal-KA U Q with boxes in Figs. 12(a) and 12(b) drawn by solid lines, respectively. Note that CS 5,π appears to be simpler than CS 4,π , and their relationship will be explicitly shown by Theorem 6 in the next section.
C. Relationships Between Formalizations
Similarly to symmetric-key encryption systems, we show the following theorem which states explicit (i.e., nonasymptotic) relationships between all the security formalizations in key agreement systems in Section VI-B.
Theorem 6: Letπ ∈ KA be a key agreement system to realize P UKS over K. Then, we have the following explicit (i.e., non-asymptotic) relationships between formalizations of correctness and security: if |K| ≥ 4, (iii) TS 2,π ≤ TS 3,π , (iv) CS 5,π ≤ TS 2,π ≤ 2 CS 5,π , (v) max CS 5,π , δ CS 2,π ≤ CS 4,π ≤ CS 5,π + δ CS 2,π . Remark 3: The relationship (ii) is already known, as it was shown in [13, Lemma 1] .
Proof: First, we show (i): By the triangle inequality of the statistical distance, we have
where the equality of (47) follows from Corollary 2. In addition, by Proposition 4, we have
Therefore, it follows from (47) and (48) . Conversely, we have
where (49) follows from Proposition 9, and (50) follows from Proposition 5. Thus, we obtain
where the equality follows from the following fact: for a constant c ≥ 3, max{x, −2x log(2x/c)} = −2x log(2x/c) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Second, we note that the proof of (ii) is given in [13, Lemma 1], and we omit the proof here.
Third, (iii) is proven as follows: For P T λ ∈ P(T λ ),
which implies that TS 2,π ≤ TS 3,π . Fourth, we show (iv): By definition, we have CS 5,π ≤ TS 2,π . In addition, for any > 0, there is a distribution P Q ∈ P(T λ ) such that CS 5,π + > (P K A T λ , P K A P Q ). Then, we have TS 2,π ≤ (P K A T λ , P K A P Q ) + (P K A P Q , P K A P T λ ) < CS 5,π + + (P Q , P T λ ) < 2( CS 5,π + ), where the last inequality follows from (P Q , P T λ ) ≤ (P K A P Q , P K A T λ ) < CS 5,π + . Thus, we obtain TS 2,π ≤ 2 CS 5,π . What remains to be shown is the statement (v), and it is proven as follows. For any distribution P Q ∈ P(T λ ), we have
where the last inequality follows from Proposition 9. By taking the infimum over all P Q ∈ P(T λ ), we have
In addition, for any distribution P Q ∈ P(T λ ), we have
by Proposition 3. By taking the infimum over all P Q ∈ P(T λ ), we have CS 5,π ≤ CS 4,π . Similarly, we have δ CS 2,π ≤ CS 4,π .
D. Asymptotic Security and Its Relationships
Similarly to Section V-B, we consider the asymptotic security of the key agreement systems. For discussing the asymptotic security of the key agreement systems, we use the notation used in Section V-B as well. The formal definition is given as follows.
Definition 10: A key agreement systemπ κ ∈ KA is said to be asymptotically Type(i, j )-secure, if
i.e., δ i,π κ = o(1) and j,π κ = o (1) .
A key agreement systemπ κ ∈ KA having asymptotic security is described by δ i,π κ = o(1) and j,π κ = o(1) for some i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 5 (i.e., by asymptotic Type(i, j )-security). Theorem 6 shows that not only δ TS 1,π κ and δ CS 2,π κ are not of the same order, but also that all j,π κ (1 ≤ j ≤ 5) are not of the same order. Therefore, we classify the key agreement systems having asymptotic security into several classes.
First, we consider the following three classes under the same condition on correctness δ CS 2,π κ = o(1), but depending on the different orders of relationships between j,π κ for 1 ≤ j ≤ 5:
Specifically, given that all j,π κ for j = 2, 4, 5 are of the same order under the condition δ CS 2,π κ = o(1) by Theorem 6, the three classes above are understood as follows: KA-I is the set of key agreement systems satisfying asymptotic Type(2, j )-security for all j = 2, 4, 5; KA-II is the set of systems satisfying asymptotic Type(2, 1)-security; and KA-III is the set of systems satisfying asymptotic Type(2, 3)-security. Furthermore, by the relationships between j,π (1 ≤ j ≤ 5) in Theorem 6, it is seen that
Second, we similarly consider the following three classes under the same condition on correctness δ TS 1,π κ = o(1), but depending on the different orders of relationships between j,π κ for 1 ≤ j ≤ 5:
Then, by the relationships between j,π (1 ≤ j ≤ 5) in Theorem 6, it is similarly seen that
Furthermore, we also have by Theorem 6 that
In this section, we show that a gap exists between every pair of the six classes above. This is stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 7: There is no inclusion relation between KA-II and KA-III , and between KA-ii and KA-iii : It holds that KA-II ⊆ KA-III (resp. KA-ii ⊆ KA-iii ) and KA-III ⊆ KA-II (resp. KA-iii ⊆ KA-ii ). Furthermore, it holds that KA-I = KA-i , KA-II = KA-ii and KA-III = KA-iii . Specifically, we have the following gaps between the formalizations.
(i) Suppose that = o(1) and = (1/ log n) for n ∈ N.
Then, there exists a key agreement systemπ satisfying the following conditions: TS 2,π ≤ , n = |K|,π is asymptotically Type(i, j )-secure for all i, j with j = 1, but not asymptotically Type(i, 1)-secure for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 2.
(ii) Suppose that = o(1/ log n) and = (1/n c ) for n ∈ N, where c is a constant with 0 < c < 1. Then, there exists a key agreement systemπ satisfying the following conditions: TS 2,π ≤ , n = |K|,π is asymptotically Type(i, j )-secure for all i, j with j = 3, but not asymptotically Type(i, 3)-secure for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 2.
(iii) Suppose that δ = o(1) and δ = (1/ log n) for n ∈ N.
Then, there exists a key agreement systemπ satisfying the following conditions: δ CS 2,π < δ, n = |K|, and for any 1 ≤ j ≤ 5,π is asymptotically Type(2, j )-secure, but not asymptotically Type(1, j )-secure. Proof: The proof concept is to use Theorem 3, which shows a gap between the security formalizations in symmetrickey encryption systems. We construct a key agreement protocol π = {π A ka , π B ka } and a correlated randomness resource P CR XY from a symmetric-key encryption protocol π = {π A enc , π B dec } and a key sharing resource P KŜ K as follows: P CR XY is constructed by setting random variables X = (M,K ) and Y =K , where P M is a distribution over K, and it is independent from PK ; π A ka takes X from the inside interface and outputs K A := M at the A-interface, and sends T = π A enc (K , M) to π B ka by P Auth( A→B) ; π B ka takes Y and T from the inside and outside interfaces, respectively, and outputs K B :=M = π B dec (K , T ) at the B-interface.
For the symmetric-key encryption systemπ = π (P KŜ K P Auth( A→B) ) and the key agreement system π = π(P CR XY P Auth ) above, we consider the symmetric-key encryption defined by (28) in the proof of Theorem 3. Then, we have
where (51) follows from Theorem 1, and (52) follows from the argument in the proof of Theorem 3. In the following text, we prove the statements (i), (ii), and (iii) of the theorem, respectively.
Proof of (i). Suppose that M is uniformly distributed over K in the above construction of π and P CR XY . Then, we have δ TS 1,π = Pr{K A = K B } = Pr{M =M} ≤ δ TS 1,π = 0. Moreover, it follows that δ CS 2,π = 0 from δ TS 1,π = 0 and Theorem 6. Furthermore, it follows from the equality (34) in the proof of Theorem 3 (ii) that, for arbitrary t j ∈ T ,
since P M is uniform. Hence, TS 3,π = o(1). However, it holds that TS 1,π = I (M; T ) = (1) by Theorem 3 (i). Therefore, summarizing the above results, we have TS 1,π = (1), TS 2,π = o(1), TS 3,π = o(1), and δ TS 1,π = δ CS 2,π = 0, and the proof is completed.
Proof of (ii). Let K = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n } and define P M over K by
Then, it follows from the equality (34) in the proof of Theorem 3 (ii) that, for = (1/n c ),
Therefore, we have TS 3,π = max t j (P M|T =t j , P M ) = (1). Meanwhile, by Theorem 6, we have TS 1,π ≤ 2 TS 2,π log(n/(2 TS 2,π )). Hence, from this inequality together with Lemma 10, it follows that TS 1,π = o(1), since = o(1/ log n) by the assumption. Furthermore, we have δ CS 2,π = (P U , P M )
and δ CS 2,π = o(1/ log n). By Theorem 6, we have δ TS 1,π ≤ 2δ CS 2,π log(n/(2δ CS 2,π )). By this inequality together with Lemma 10, we obtain δ TS 1,π = o(1). Summarizing the above results, we have TS 1,π = o(1), TS 2,π = o(1), TS 3,π = (1), and δ TS 1,π = o(1), δ CS 2,π = o(1), and the proof is completed.
Proof of (iii). Suppose thatπ satisfies δ TS 1,π = 0 and TS 1,π = 0 in the above construction. Let K = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n } and define P M over K by
Then, for the uniform distribution P U over K, we have
Therefore, we have δ CS
Meanwhile, we obtain
Note that (53) is the same as (32) if δ = , and by the same discussion in the proof of Theorem 3 (i), we have δ TS 1,π = log |K| − H (M) = (1). From the above discussion, it is sufficient to prove that TS 1,π = 0 to complete the proof, and it follows from that TS 1,π = I (M; T ) ≤ TS 1,π = 0. Therefore, summarizing the above results, we have TS 1,π = TS 2,π = TS 3,π = 0, and δ TS 1,π = (1), δ CS 2,π = o(1), and the proof is completed.
By the above discussion, we obtain the following three propositions:
(a)π ∈ KA-II ⇒π ∈ KA-I , andπ ∈ KA-ii ⇒π ∈ KA-i .
andπ ∈ KA-iii ⇒π ∈ KA-III . However, for each proposition above, the converse does not hold. As we did in Section V-B, we consider the following questions: How fast does TS 2,π need to converge to zero for the converse of proposition (a) or (b) to hold? How fast does δ CS 2,π need to converge to zero for the converse of proposition (c) to hold? The following theorem provides answers to the questions.
Theorem 8: It holds that: (i) Ifπ ∈ KA-I (resp.,π ∈ KA-i ) satisfies a condition TS 2,π = o(1/ log |K|), then we haveπ ∈ KA-II (resp., π ∈ KA-ii ); (ii) Ifπ ∈ KA-I (resp.,π ∈ KA-i ) satisfies a condition
where P K A ranges over P(K) such that (P K A , P U ) = o(1) (resp., D(P K A P U ) = o(1)), then we haveπ ∈ KA-III (resp.,π ∈ KA-iii ); (iii) Ifπ ∈ KA-I satisfies a condition δ CS 2,π = o(1/ log |K|), then we haveπ ∈ KA-i . Similarly, ifπ ∈ KA-II (resp., π ∈ KA-III ) satisfies δ CS 2,π = o(1/ log |K|), then we havê π ∈ KA-ii (resp.,π ∈ KA-iii ).
Proof: First, we show (i): By Theorem 6, we have TS 1,π ≤ 2 TS 2,π log(|K|/(2 TS 2,π )). Therefore, (i) follows from this inequality together with Lemma 10.
Next, we show (ii): Let t λ 0 = arg TS 3,π , i.e., TS 3,π = (P K A |T λ =t λ 0 , P K A ). Then, we have
Therefore, we have the inequality TS 3,π ≤ TS 2,π sup
where P K A runs satisfying (P K A , P U ) ≤ δ CS 2,π = o(1) if π ∈ KA-I , and P K A runs satisfying D(P K A P U ) = log |K| − H (K A ) ≤ δ TS 1,π = o(1) ifπ ∈ KA-i . Theorem 8 (ii) follows from the inequality (54).
Finally, we show (iii): The proof concept is the same as that of (i). By Theorem 6, we have δ TS 1,π ≤ 2δ CS 2,π log(|K|/(2δ CS 2,π )). Then, (iii) follows from this inequality together with Lemma 10.
Theorem 8 provides us a sufficient condition for the converse to hold for each of the three propositions (a), (b), and (c) under consideration. Moreover, all the conditions in Theorem 8 except for (ii) is tight, given the underlying inequalities shown by Theorem 6 are asymptotically tight.
E. Application of Relationships: Lower Bounds
As an application of the relationships in Theorem 6, we can derive a family of lower bounds in key agreement systems in a comprehensive manner, if there is a lower bound under some Type(i, j )-security. In this section, as such an applied bound, we consider the following lower bound, which can be derived using a similar technique used in Proposition 12 in Section V-C. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 15: For a key agreement systemπ = π (P CR XY P Auth ) ∈ KA to construct a key sharing resource P KS K over K, we have inf
In particular, for a key agreement systemπ ∈ KA to construct P UKS over K, we have
By using the relationships in Theorem 6 together with the bound in Proposition 15, we can derive a family of lower bounds in Propositions 16 and 17.
Proposition 16: For any key agreement systemπ = π(P CR XY P Auth ) ∈ KA to construct P UKS over K, we have the following lower bounds on the security quantities: Proof: The proof immediately follows from Proposition 16.
Finally, from Proposition 15, we obtain Proposition 18, which is an impossibility result for key agreement. Furthermore, we provide Corollaries 4 and 5 below, as illustrations of impossibility results which are special cases of Proposition 18. The proofs immediately follow from Propositions 16 and 18, and we omit them.
Proposition 18: Let P KS K be a key sharing resource, and let P CR XY be a correlated randomness resource. In addition, let be a real number such that < 1 − 2 H 0 (X,Y )−H ∞ (K ) . Then, there exists no key agreement protocol π such that P CR XY P Auth π, ⇒ P KS K , even if the arbitrary number of usage of authenticated channels is allowed.
Corollary 4: Even if the arbitrary number of usage of authenticated channels is allowed, there is no key agreement protocol π such that P Auth π, ⇒ P KS K for < 1 − 1/2 H ∞ (K ) . Specifically, there is no (δ, )-Type(i, j )-secure key agreement protocol, which constructs P UKS (even with 1-bit keys) starting from only authenticated communications, if δ, ∈ [0, 1] are real numbers such that: (iv) + δ < 1 2 for i = 2 and j ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}.
Corollary 5: Let l and s be nonnegative integers with l < s. Moreover, we denote the uniform key sharing resource with l-bit keys by P UKS l , and let P KS K ,s be a key sharing resource with s-bit keys according to a probability distribution P K . Then, there is no protocol π such that P Auth P UKS l π, ⇒ P KS K ,s for < 1 − 2 l−H ∞ (K ) . Specifically, there is no (δ, )-Type(i, j )secure key agreement protocol which constructs P KS K ,s from P UKS l and authenticated communications if δ, ∈ [0, 1] are some real numbers that satisfy the inequality in Corollary 4.
Finally in this subsection, we remark the tightness of the lower bounds in key agreement systems. Although Propositions 16-18 were successful to deal with the special cases of P XY , such as X and Y being constant (see Corollary 4), or X and Y being identical (see Corollary 5), it would not be enough to analyze other intermediate cases (e.g., P XY such that 0 < I (X; Y ) < H (X, Y )). Here, we recall that our bounds are derived from the bound (55) in Proposition 15 with the relationships in Theorem 6. More generally, if there is a tighter bound under some Type(i, j )-security, we have a good chance to derive a family of tighter bounds in a comprehensive manner by using the relationships in Theorem 6.
For the intermediate cases of P XY mentioned previously, the tighter bounds are derived by Maurer [27] , and by Ahlswede and Csiszár [1] . Specifically, [27, Corollary 1] shows that
where h(·) is the binary entropy function, for a key agreement systemπ having (δ, )-Type(1, 1)-security. By combining the above bound with log |K| − H (K ) ≤ δ, we obtain
for the key agreement systemπ having (δ, )-Type(1, 1)security. Furthermore, by combining the relationships in Theorem 6 with the bound (57), instead of (55), we obtain a family of bounds
forπ satisfying (δ, )-Type(i, j ) security with some function f i, j (x, y) such that f i, j (0, 0) = 0 for all i, j . Then, the bounds (58) should be tighter than the those in Proposition 17 for the intermediate cases of P XY .
VII. CONCLUSION
To realize the encryption and key agreement systems, we considered the following system design in this paper: (1) The encryption system is constructed from an authenticated channel and a secret key; (2) The key agreement system is constructed from an authenticated channel and a correlated random key. Here, we dealt with the above systems with much generality, i.e., without discussing how each component resource (i.e., a channel and a key) is constructed, by describing the execution of the systems by means of probability distributions.
Then, we considered the following formalizations of information-theoretic security for the resulting systems above:
(i) Relaxed perfect secrecy: Formalization of relaxed Shannon's perfect secrecy, (ii) Information-theoretic indistinguishability and semantic security: Formalizations of indistinguishability and semantic security by Goldwasser and Micali; however we allow an adversary to have unbounded computing powers, (iii) Composable security: Formalization in the framework of constructive cryptography by Maurer and Renner. In this paper, we showed the relationships between the formalizations above for the encryption and key agreement in a non-asymptotic manner (see Theorems 1 and 6). Moreover, we obtained the following results in an asymptotic manner:
• In the case of encryption, there are significant gaps among the formalizations of relaxed perfect secrecy, information-theoretic indistinguishability and semantic security, and composable security. Specifically, a certain type of relaxed perfect secrecy or a variant of information-theoretic indistinguishability is the strongest notion (see Theorem 3). In addition, we clarified the sufficient conditions on security parameters for making the security formalizations equivalent for encryption (see Theorems 4 and 5);
• In the case of key agreement, there are significant gaps among the formalizations of relaxed perfect secrecy and composable security. Specifically, a certain type of relaxed perfect secrecy is the strongest notion (see Theorem 7). In addition, we clarified the sufficient conditions on security parameters for making the security formalizations equivalent for key agreement (see Theorem 8) . In other words, we arrived at the following important results: (1) For the stand-alone security (i.e., relaxed perfect secrecy, information-theoretic indistinguishability and semantic security) of the encryption and/or key agreement systems, there are significant gaps among the formalizations. Therefore, we should be careful in adopting a security definition among the possible definitions in designing encryption and/or key agreement systems depending on the situation;
(2) For composability, if the encryption system (resp., key agreement system) satisfies the stand-alone security, it can be composed with other systems without additional care in the application where it is regarded as the secure channel resource (resp., the uniform key sharing resource).
We believe that our results above are interesting both from a theoretic viewpoint and a practical aspect because it would be beneficial in the system designs to select suitable system parameters depending on the situation. ∃(x, y) ∈ Supp(P XY ) such that t i = f i (x, t 1 , . . . , t i−1 ) for odd i , t λ = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t λ ) ∈ T λ t j = f j (y, t 1 , . . . , t j −1 ) for even j , k A = g A (x, t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t λ ), and k B = g B (y, t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t λ )
π ,T λ k A ,k B ,x,y := ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ t i = f i (x, t 1 , . . . , t i−1 ) for odd i , t λ = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t λ ) ∈ T λ t j = f j (y, t 1 , . . . , t j −1 ) for even j , k A = g A (x, t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t λ ), and k B = g B (y, t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t λ ) 
where (61) follows from π ,C m,m,k ∩ π ,C m ,m ,k = ∅ if m = m , because we assume that π B dec deterministically executes the decryption.
We return to the proof of Proposition 19. If π B dec is deterministic, the lower bound (59) follows from (60) and Claim 2. We next consider the case of π B dec being probabilistic. Let R be a finite set of random numbers, and suppose that π B dec chooses a random number r ∈ R to execute the decryption according to a probability distribution P R . For each r ∈ R, we define a symmetric-key encryption protocol π r = (π A enc , π B dec [r ]), where π B dec [r ] is equal to π B dec with a fixed r ∈ R. π B dec chooses a deterministic π B dec [r ] from {π B dec [r ] | r ∈ R} according to P R , and hence Claim 2 can be applied. Specifically, even if π B dec is probabilistic, the lower bound (59) cannot be improved. Therefore, the lower bound (59) holds without any assumption on π B dec . Proposition 12 follows from Proposition 19 by taking the uniform distribution over M as P M ∈ P(M).
B. Proof of Proposition 15
Suppose thatπ = π(P CR XY P Auth ). Let Supp(P XY ) = {(x, y)|P XY (x, y) > 0} ⊆ X × Y be the support of P XY .
For any k A ∈ K, and k B ∈ K, we define (62) as shown at the top of the this page. For any (x, y) ∈ Supp(P XY ), k A ∈ K, and k B ∈ K, we also define (63) as shown at the top of the this page.
For an arbitrary simulator P Sim Q , we have
where the inequality follows from (1) . We now need the following claim. Claim 3: Suppose that g A and g B in π are deterministic. Then, we have Proof: Note that P Ideal-KA K K Q satisfies that P Ideal-KA
Thus, we have (65)
where (65) follows from π ,T λ k,k,x,y ∩ π ,T λ k ,k ,x,y = ∅ if k = k , since we assume that g A and g B are deterministic.
We return to the proof of Proposition 15. If g A and g B are deterministic, it follows from (64) and Claim 3 that
We next show that the lower bound (66) holds, even if g A or g B is probabilistic. Let R A (resp. R B ) be a finite set, and suppose that g A (resp. g B ) chooses a random number r A ∈ R A (resp. r B ∈ R B ) according to a probability distribution P R A (resp. P R B ). Note that, if g A (resp. g B ) is deterministic, it is sufficient to assume |R A | = 1 (resp. |R B | = 1). For each fixed (r A , r B ) ∈ R A × R B , a key agreement protocol π (r A ,r B ) is specified in which g A with inputting r A and g B with inputting r B are deterministic. Therefore, we can derive the lower bound (66) for π (r A ,r B ) . Hence, even if g A (resp. g B ) chooses r A ∈ R A (resp. r B ∈ R B ) according to P R A (resp. P R B ), this lower bound cannot be improved. Therefore, the proof is completed.
